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abstract
The link between ineffective forest monitoring and forest degradation is well known. Under
REDD+, monitoring stands to become more important as a means of maintaining incentive.
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Little attention however has been paid to the possible adverse consequences of forest
monitoring. Our research develops a spatially explicit, agent-based model (ABM) of timber
extraction in a Congo Basin forest concession to investigate the potential conservation
impact of more effective monitoring. We modeled the building of access roads, and logging
of legal timber and illegal timber, where illegal timber may be interpreted broadly to include
prohibited species, smaller trees, or trees in areas where cutting is not permitted. We
investigated road building under (1) random spot monitoring of logging sites and (2)
monitoring of logged trunks at checkpoints. Our ﬁndings indicate that although more
effective monitoring can reduce illegal harvesting, it can also lead to construction of denser
road networks and higher levels of forest fragmentation, with an implied loss of biodiversity. These insights are particularly relevant in the context of REDD+, as they suggest that
some monitoring strategies may lead to more forest fragmentation, even as they help reduce
emissions.

1.

Introduction

Where conservation and environmental outcomes are concerned, monitoring is essential. A consistent body of research
shows that poor monitoring and enforcement lead to negative
conservation consequences such as habitat degradation and
loss of biodiversity (e.g., Barrett et al., 2001), and effective
monitoring helps overcome problems of illegal harvesting and
resulting adverse environmental outcomes (Chhatre and
Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005). Relatively few scholars
see more effective monitoring as producing negative consequences; those who do mostly cite greater costs associated
with more comprehensive or careful monitoring that may not
yield commensurate beneﬁts in terms of reduced illegal or
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undesirable activities. Under the proposed activities of
regimes such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) (Agrawal et al., 2011; Phelps et al.,
2010; Stickler et al., 2009), monitoring and enforcement will be
critical in establishing incentives for landholders and reducing
risks for investors. Understanding the link between forest
monitoring and land cover outcomes is thus of importance.
Our research adds a new dimension to the existing work on
resource governance by incorporating a spatial component to
the analysis of monitoring. Using an agent-based model (ABM),
we investigated how more effective monitoring may inﬂuence
conservation outcomes in logging concessions in tropical
forests. Our results suggest that incorporating the spatial
features of monitoring and resources is important to better
understand the relationship between improved monitoring and

its impacts on conservation. In particular, our analysis suggests
that depending on the spatial distribution of resources being
protected, more effective monitoring might undercut one of the
key goals of improved governance of logging concessions:
conservation of biodiversity.
Results from our ABM of monitoring indicate that although
more effective monitoring can reduce illegal forest harvesting,
it can simultaneously lead to higher levels of forest fragmentation, with an implied loss of biodiversity. The link is that
effective monitoring and enforcement causes logging companies to harvest only legal timber, thereby driving them to
harvest less intensively in any given location and instead build
a more extensive road network that allows them to harvest
over a wider area. Recent accelerated growth of road networks
in the Congo Basin has been documented (Laporte et al., 2007);
the impacts of these road networks on forest structure and
access can adversely affect biodiversity even as monitoring
reduces illegal harvesting, net levels of timber extraction, and
terrestrial emissions.
In our study, we modeled the building of access roads, and
logging in forest concessions of two classes of tree: legal
timber and illegal timber, where the model allows illegal
timber to be interpreted broadly to include prohibited species,
smaller trees, or trees in areas where cutting is not permitted.
We investigated road building under two types of monitoring
and enforcement – (1) random spot monitoring of logging sites
and (2) monitoring of logged trunks at checkpoints – in order
to make a link between levels of monitoring effectiveness and
outcomes for both the forest and concession-holder. Our
results show that under both approaches, a greater expected
penalty leads concession holders to refrain from cutting
illegal timber and instead to build more extensive access
roads to cut legal timber. Higher forest fragmentation
(measured as lower average distances of forest grid cells to
roads for a given total harvest) is consistently observed across
forests with varying densities of legal timber when effective
monitoring is present.

2.

Background

The Congo Basin holds the world’s second largest contiguous
tropical rainforest, and the largest in Africa. Forestry in the
Congo Basin is similar to arrangements in tropical rainforests
elsewhere, with most land being cut under large-scale
(>100,000 ha) concessions (Mertens et al., 2001), along with
other arrangements for felling of trees at smaller scales
(2500 ha in the Cameroon case). Of the ﬁve ITTO-member
countries in the Congo Basin, industrial concession forestry is
most active in Gabon, Cameroon, and Republic of Congo (ROC),
with dwindling forest resources in the Central African
Republic (CAR) and as-yet undeveloped potential in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Pérez et al., 2005). Congo
Basin forestry is highly selective with the focus of timber
operators being on only a few species, and only a few trees
felled per hectare (Pérez et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). This
means that the direct impact of forestry is more degradation
than deforestation (Zhang et al., 2006). The handful of species
that dominate production include Okoumé (Aucoumea klaineana) in Gabon and the coast of ROC; Sapelli (Entandrophragma

cylindricum) and Sipo (Entandrophragma utile) in the interior of
ROC, CAR, and parts of Cameroon; Ayous (Triphlochiton
scleroxylon), Iroko (Milicia excelsa and Chlorophora excelsa), and
Azobé (Lophira alata) in DRC and much of Cameroon (Pérez
et al., 2005).
Although the term ‘concession’ has a broad interpretation
in the literature (Hardin, 2011), here we follow Karsenty et al.
(2008) and use it to refer speciﬁcally to industrial forestry
operations. In the Congo Basin context, ‘industrial’ has also
come to mean ‘foreign’; while many national logging companies exist in Cameroon for example (with the number rising),
foreign industrial logging operations still account for ﬁve
times more felled trees by volume than these Cameroonian
enterprises (Brown and Ekoko, 2001). In some ways, foreign
and national logging companies occupy different niches in the
industry. For example, foreign groups are more able to cope
with regulations and costs of larger concessions, while
national groups are better positioned to exploit local markets
and work with local governments (Pérez et al., 2006).
Concessions in the basin are typically on the order of the
length of a single harvest rotation (25–30 years), with cutting
authorized annually and the contract subject to cancellation,
helping in theory to reduce ‘hit-and-run’ plundering of forest
resources (Karsenty et al., 2008). However, this requires
commitment from governments to monitor and enforce
regulations (Karsenty et al., 2008), and forest administrations
in the region typically lack technical, human, and ﬁnancial
resources (Pérez et al., 2005). Concession arrangements favor
ex-post monitoring (Karsenty et al., 2008), which can increase
the risk and transaction costs associated with felling in
inappropriate areas, for example. This weeds out less-efﬁcient
operators, who in many cases are more destructive in their
practices (Gbetnkom, 2005).
In this study we spatially examine the impacts that
effective monitoring may have on illegal cutting in industrial
forest concessions using an agent-based model of road
building, tree cutting, and forest monitoring. Agent-based
modeling (ABM) has been applied to a range of natural
resource management issues in recent years (see BenDor et al.,
2009; Berger, 2001; Berger et al., 2005; Elliston and Cao, 2006;
Schlueter et al., 2009; Summers et al., 2004). In an ABM
approach to modeling a system (such as agricultural, ﬁshing,
or forestry), individual resource users are modeled as ‘agents’.
These agents observe conditions in their environment
(resources, climate, market prices, the actions of other agents,
or even the consequences of their own past actions) and make
decisions based on these observations, following a set of
behavioral rules built into the model. Landscape-scale outcomes emerge as the consequence of the set of modeled
individual decisions (e.g., deforestation patterns emerging out
of individual choices about land use on farms; or fertility rates
emerging out of individual decisions between work, school,
and having children). The key contribution of the ABM
framework to natural resource management is the ability to
build links across scales between the decision processes of
resource stakeholders and system-level environmental outcomes, both (1) to test how well candidate models of decisionmaking can explain observed environmental outcomes and (2)
to understand what the possible consequences of observed
decision-making processes may be for the future of natural

resource systems. It is this latter application of ABM that we
develop in this paper.
It is important to emphasize that the ABM framework and
approach in our analysis has more an exploratory than a
predictive role, because it is generally quite difﬁcult to make
precise predictions in the types of coupled natural-human
systems that are typically the focus of ABM approaches
(Bankes, 2002). Results from single simulation runs in an ABM
framework can be strongly path dependent and not predictive
of the most likely outcome in the real system; however, the
results observed across a large number of model runs provide
a better representation of the ‘possibility space’ (range of
possible outcomes) of environmental outcomes for the system
(Brown et al., 2005). Analysis of this possibility space can
provide valuable qualitative insights, rather than precise
predictions, into system behavior and response. In this study
we use this analytical approach to gain insight into the
consequences for forests of effective monitoring of forestry
operations, and to highlight key areas for empirical research
on concession forestry worldwide that will help validate our
understanding of the impacts of the monitoring and enforcement process.

3.

Model summary

The model is intended to investigate the economic impacts on
holders of a timber concession (the rights to cut timber in a
speciﬁed area during a speciﬁed period), and environmental
impacts on the land managed within the concession, of
increased effort into monitoring and sanctioning operations.
The model is informed by conditions in the logging industry in
Cameroon, and includes three main components: (1) a forest
patch, (2) a logging agent with rights to cut trees in the patch
(concession) and (3) a monitoring agent, representing government or independent efforts to observe cutting infractions and
levy ﬁnes.
The forest patch consists of discrete cells. Each grid cell in
the forest patch has three state variables: a volume of legal
timber (LT), a volume of illegal timber (IT), and a distance to
nearest road, if one exists. IT can be broadly interpreted to
include trees of protected species, of insufﬁcient diameter,
and trees in areas where cutting is not permitted. Timber
distribution is generated by randomly placed ‘hot-spots’ of
timber densities drawn from a power distribution, which are
then kernel-smoothed to re-create the occurrence of clusters
of commercially valuable species.
In the model, the holder of the logging concession and the
monitor act on a forest patch representing the area allocated for
cutting in a single year, assumed to be 1600 ha (Fig. A.1); there
are k cutting days in each year. The holder of the logging
concession has a deﬁned capacity Vcap that can be cut from the
patch, and this capacity is spread evenly across k cutting days
into Vcap,k; between cutting days the holder of the logging
concession builds the necessary roads to access timber of
interest. The value Vcap is deﬁned in the current study by the
legal constraint imposed in the forest management plan
(Appendix B), though it is important to note that it can also
be interpreted in the model framework as a technological
(capital) or labor constraint. The concession holder has initial

information of the timber density in a subsample of grid cells in
the forest patch (analogous to a prior survey) but also sees all
grid cells within a distance of the road as cutting progresses.
The road-building strategy in this model follows FAO
(1995), where the concession holder builds roads to access the
densest sites of legal timber. When illegal timber is found
within cutting distance from these roads, the concession
holder makes a decision as to whether it will be more
proﬁtable to ﬁll some capacity with this available illegal timber
(rather than perhaps having to build more roads to meet
capacity with timber that can be cut legally). This rule can be
thought of as a constraint placed upon the more optimal
strategy of building roads speciﬁcally to access illegal timber.
As will be shown in the following sections, to the extent that
the unconstrained, optimal strategy pervades in practice, we
would expect the results shown in the current study (which
compares the less-constrained to the more-constrained cases
of ineffectively and effectively monitored forest patches) to be
even stronger and more signiﬁcant.
On each cutting day the monitor has the opportunity to
observe cutting and administer ﬁnes. This monitoring occurs
in one of two ways: (1) a random spot monitoring approach,
analogous to the idea of the monitor visiting a set of randomly
selected locations within the site and checking tree stumps,
and (2) a checkpoint monitoring approach, analogous to a
monitor waiting at a roadside checkpoint and inspecting
timber loads leaving the site at the end of each cutting day.
Note that our model does not represent the processes that
mediate a policy signal sent out by a governing body to enforce
a regulation (Fig. 1, ﬁrst arrow). Rather, the model focuses on
the relationship between the mediated, perceived signal and
the particular environmental goal of interest (Fig. 1, second
arrow). Thus, the sanction and effort parameters can be
thought of as mediated policy signals perceived by the
concessionaire in which bribery and corruption are implicit.
The role of governance in shaping the mediated policy signal
(Fig. 1, ﬁrst arrow) is an additional critical area for tropical
forests research (e.g., Pedlowski et al., 2005; Soares-Filho et al.,
2006), to which our model is complementary in completing the
link between forest governance initiatives and measurable
forest-cover outcomes.
The use of mediated policy signals allows analysis in a
relatively simple model of the beneﬁts that may accrue, and
adverse consequences that may arise, through a more
effectively implemented regulation. However, because we
do not know the relationship between real efforts invested and
mediated signal perceived (Fig. 1, ﬁrst arrow), we are unable to
assess the real costs of achieving forest outcomes through
either monitoring approach, nor make economic comparisons
between them. We note this set of relationships as important

Fig. 1 – Simple linear approximation for the regulation
process for natural resources like forests. The current
study deals exclusively with the second part of the
process, the relationship between the perceived policy
signal and the environmental outcome.

Fig. 2 – Fraction of illegal timber still standing at the end of a cutting cycle of 1 year in a forest patch, as a function of
increasing sanction severity (into the page) and monitoring effort (from left to right), under spot-monitoring (left) and
checkpoint monitoring (right) regimes.

areas for future research, and restrict ourselves in the
following analysis to, again, investigating the relationships
between net perceived policy signals and forest outcomes.
An additional but important simpliﬁcation in this model is
that all roads are treated equivalently – the model does not
distinguish between more vs. less permanent roads in terms of
their ability to provide access or their capacity to degrade and
fragment. A valuable extension of the current model and its
ﬁndings will be to distinguish motivations for building roads of
varying degrees of permanence and link these to higherﬁdelity model outcomes.
A full description of the model following the ODD
(Overview, Design concepts, and Details) protocol of Grimm
et al. (2006, 2010) is included as Appendix B. Model parameters
are summarized in Appendix B.

4.

Model experiments

In the experiments described here, we focus on the effects of
two key parameters of both monitoring approaches: (1) the
severity of the sanction and (2) the level of effort invested in
monitoring and enforcement. For both monitoring
approaches, the severity of sanctions is represented by the

ﬁne levied per cubic meter of illegal timber detected. For spot
monitoring, the level of effort is simply the likelihood in a
given timestep of a given grid cell being randomly checked. For
the checkpoint monitoring, the level of effort is represented by
the maximum probability (i.e., when the truck is full of IT) of
being stopped and caught at the checkpoint.
We also vary the ratio of legal timber to illegal timber, LT:IT,
in the forest while maintaining constant average biomass
density across experiments. This allows us to examine
concessionaire decision making over the shift from a forest
in which most timber present may be legally cut, to a forest in
which most timber is protected and there is little available for
cutting.
Finally, we vary the extent of the initial survey performed
by the concessionaire, to explore the effect of information on
concessionaire decisions in cutting and road building. These
results are summarized in Appendix B, as our main effects are
largely unaffected by changes in initial information.
Although in practice many factors may affect the substitutability of stronger sanctions for effort in monitoring, in the
current simple model these two dimensions are clear
substitutes, as seen by the symmetry in Fig. 2; these panels
depict the changes in standing forest biomass that occur in the
transition from an ineffective to an effective monitoring

Table 1 – Effort and fine levels represented by ordinal ‘monitoring effectiveness’ dimension in experiments.
Monitoring effectiveness

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Random spot monitoring

Checkpoint monitoring

Harvest
ﬁne ($/m3)

Effort (probability of a given
grid cell being monitored)

Harvest
ﬁne ($/m3)

Effort (probability of catching
a truck ﬁlled with IT)

0
100
200
500
1000
2000
5000
10,000

0
0.000625
0.00125
0.003125
0.0625
0.0125
0.03125
0.0625

0
100
200
500
1000
2000
5000
10,000

0
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.2
0.5
1

regime as sanctions and monitoring effort are increased. We
observed the same symmetry in results for a wide range of
various parameter values (not reported here). Making use of
this, we collapse the two dimensions of sanction severity and

monitoring effort into a single ordinal dimension of ‘monitoring effectiveness’ to simplify the presentation of our analysis.
The scaling of sanction severity with effort as monitoring
effectiveness increases in each of the spot and checkpoint

Fig. 3 – Fraction of LT left standing in a patch after one year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (coming out
of the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from left to right). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the
second year of the modeling run, after the concession-holder has estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot
monitoring is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.

Fig. 4 – Fraction of IT left standing in a patch after one year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (going into
the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from right to left). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the second
year of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot monitoring
is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.

monitoring cases is summarized in Table 1, and can be
thought of as a cut along the diagonal from the origin running
between the effort dimensions (upper left to lower right in
each panel of Fig. 2). This approach is also consistent with
most of the economic literature on monitoring, starting with
Becker (1968), which emphasizes the expected value of
penalties. We have selected monitoring and sanction parameters such that the major shift away from cutting illegal timber
occurs over a monitoring effectiveness range of 1–8, with
much of the transition in both approaches occurring at a
monitoring effectiveness of 5 or 6. Beyond this qualitative
comparison, we make no claim that a given monitoring
effectiveness value means the same thing for both monitoring
approaches.
In all ﬁgures in this report, each point is generated as the
mean of 32 replicate model runs. Results shown are for the
forest patch logged in the second year of the model run, after
the concession-holder has had time to estimate costs
associated with monitoring. Variance among replicates in
the amount of IT preserved is greatest during the transition
from a low-effectiveness to a high-effectiveness regime for the
spot monitoring approach, and in the ‘Sometimes cut’ regime
for the checkpoint monitoring approach (Fig. 2, Appendix B).
Variance in the extent of road building increases with
monitoring effectiveness under both monitoring approaches
(Appendix B). Figs. 2–4 and 6 show statistics based on the forest
cells in the grid and are comparatively smooth; Fig. 5 shows
statistics based on the relatively smaller number of road nodes
within the grid and is comparatively rough, while still
exhibiting clear trends.

5.

Model results and discussion

5.1.
Outcomes – standing legal and illegal timber, roads
built and proﬁts earned
Increased monitoring effectiveness leads to more illegal
timber standing at the end of the k cutting days, and a greater
cutting of legal timber for both monitoring approaches,
lending important face validity to the functioning of the
model (Figs. 3 and 4). Note that the surfaces are rotated
differently for each variable to improve the views of the
surfaces. In Fig. 3, monitoring effectiveness is shown as
increasing coming out of the page; in Fig. 4, it increases going
into the page. The ratio of LT:IT is displayed as increasing from
left to right in Fig. 5, and from right to left in Fig. 4.
For the purposes of analysis we discuss three regimes of
concessionaire response: the ‘Always cut IT’ (monitoring
effectiveness of 2–5 under spot monitoring, and 2–4 under
checkpoint monitoring), ‘Never cut IT’ (monitoring effectiveness of 6–8 under spot monitoring), and ‘Sometimes cut IT’
(monitoring effectiveness of 5–8 under checkpoint monitoring) regimes.

5.2.
The low regulation, ‘Always cut IT’ regime
(monitoring effectiveness 2–5 under spot monitoring, 2–4
under checkpoint monitoring)
When monitoring effectiveness is low, it makes economic
sense for the concessionaire to cut both LT and IT in all

Fig. 5 – Average distance (in cells) of a given cell to a road in a patch after one year, as a function of increasing monitoring
effectiveness (coming out of the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from right to left). Results are shown for the forest
patch logged in the second year of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The
response to spot monitoring is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.

instances – at least 80% of both LT and IT are cut when
monitoring effectiveness is less than 5 (Figs. 3 and 4). Notably in
this regime, for both spot and checkpoint monitoring cases,
both LT and IT decrease as the ratio of LT:IT in the forest
decreases. This also corresponds with an increase in the
amount of roads that are being built, increasing the number of
branching points and decreasing the average distance from any
given cell in the patch to a road (Figs. 5 and 6). The reason for this
is that between cutting days, concessionaires build roads until
they can potentially meet capacity by LT alone, even if the roads
built pass through hotspots of LT and IT; it is only in the moment
of cutting that they make the decision to cut IT instead of LT.
Thus, as the overall proportion of LT in the forest patch
decreases, roads must become longer and more branched to be
able to meet capacity only by cutting LT. In building the roads in
this way, the concessionaire incidentally chooses to cut more IT
along the way when monitoring level is low.
This pattern in the roads is speciﬁc to the earlier-stated
assumption that roads built by the concession holders will
reﬂect only plans to cut LT, and is a strong function of initial
information when the ratio LT:IT is high. That is, the less
information concession holders have when they plan where to
build roads, the less they are able to target LT hotspots and the
less difference the actual ratio of LT:IT makes. Furthermore,
the less information they have, the less efﬁciently they are
likely to build roads (see cases for LT:IT of 1 and 4 in
Appendix B).

5.3.
Effective spot monitoring – the ‘Never cut IT’ regime
(monitoring effectiveness 6–8)
When monitoring effectiveness is sufﬁciently high in the spot
monitoring case, the concessionaire cuts no IT (except when

building roads), in order to avoid paying ﬁnes. In the spot
monitoring case, there is a clear tipping point (around a
monitoring effectiveness of 5 or 6) above which a large fraction
of IT remains standing (Fig. 4). In this regime, IT is cut only as a
side effect of roads building. Above this tipping point, effort is
shifted into cutting LT, and more roads (with more branches)
are built in order to reach the desired volume of LT. Within the
‘Never cut’ regime, similar responses to changes in the LT:IT
ratio are observed as in the ‘Always cut’ regime – the less LT
there is, the more roads get built and the more timber gets cut.
The notable exception to this is that the fraction of IT standing
no longer changes as LT:IT decreases. In the ‘Never cut’
regime, the concessionaire will avoid cutting IT whenever
possible.
The threshold, tipping-point behavior occurs because (i)
the concessionaire is cutting IT only when roads are already
built, (ii) total cutting costs in the model are a linear function of
volume, and (iii) all cells in the grid have an equal likelihood of
being monitored. Thus, depending on the level of monitoring
effectiveness, it either always makes economic sense to cut IT
when it is close by, or never makes sense. Once the penalty is
high enough, concessionaires shift their practices and do not
cut IT at all (except to build roads).

5.4.
Effective checkpoint monitoring – the ‘Sometimes cut
IT’ regime (monitoring effectiveness 5–8)
Under checkpoint monitoring, as effectiveness increases we
observe similar increases in the fraction of IT standing, but
there is no ‘Never cut’ regime within the parameter range
explored in this study. Instead, we observe a broader ‘Sometimes cut’ regime, across which the fraction of IT standing
increases as LT:IT decreases and monitoring effectiveness

Fig. 6 – Number of road branch points (nodes) in a patch after one year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness
(going into the page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from right to left). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in
the second year of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot
monitoring is shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.

Fig. 7 – Net value (profits) derived during one year, as a function of increasing monitoring effectiveness (coming out of the
page) and increasing initial ratio of LT:IT (from left to right). Results are shown for the forest patch logged in the second year
of the modeling run, after the concessionaire has estimated the risks of being caught. The response to spot monitoring is
shown on the left; the response to checkpoint monitoring is shown on the right.

increases (Fig. 4). Similarly, the density of roads increases with
an increase in monitoring effectiveness (Figs. 5 and 6).
The reason for this more gradual transition is that the
probability of getting caught depends on how much IT is
loaded in the truck. Each additional unit of IT in the truck
changes the probability of being caught in the same way, but
with more IT in the truck, the penalty is greater. Thus, there
comes a point at which the concessionaire is not willing to
take any further risk of being caught (and paying ﬁnes on the
stock of IT in the truck), but this point moves depending on
how effective the monitoring regime is. We observe a more
continuous shift toward LT and away from IT as monitoring
effectiveness increases, in contrast to the sharp tipping point
in the spot monitoring case (compare spot monitoring and
checkpoint monitoring at monitoring effectiveness values of 5
and 6 in Figs. 3 and 4).
Across this continuous shift we are able to observe a
different response to a change in the ratio LT:IT than observed
in the spot monitoring case. When checkpoint monitoring is
effective, the fraction of IT left standing increases as the ratio
LT:IT decreases (visible most clearly in the transition region
above a monitoring effectiveness of 4, Fig. 4). The simple
explanation is that when there is less IT overall (when LT:IT is
high), there is less IT to tempt the concessionaire and it will
make up less of what is in the truck when it is cut. Further,
each unit of IT cut represents a greater fraction of the total IT
in the forest. As a result, the concessionaire gets caught less
and leaves less of the IT remaining in the forest when LT is
plentiful. As the ratio of LT:IT drops, there is more IT to cut,
meaning that even as the concessionaire cuts more (and gets
caught more) there remains more IT left on the ground.

5.5.

Concessionaire proﬁtability

The impact of monitoring and forest structure on the
concessionaire’s proﬁts is easily understood. Proﬁts rise
slightly in the ‘Always cut’ regimes as LT:IT decreases and
more timber is cut, but drop off signiﬁcantly as monitoring
effectiveness increases into the ‘Never cut’ and ‘Sometimes
cut’ regimes; these latter drops are greater when the ratio of
LT:IT is lower (Fig. 7). Proﬁts drop signiﬁcantly more for the
concessionaire under checkpoint monitoring. This reﬂects the
lower precision in the model with which the concessionaire (at
the point of cutting) estimates the expected cost of illegal
harvesting under checkpoint monitoring (proportional to the
ﬁnal load of IT at the end of the cutting day), compared with
that under spot monitoring (proportional only to the value of
IT to be cut at the current site).

6.

Key ﬁndings and implications

The major result from this study is that more effective
monitoring leads to greater amounts of road building and
greater branching of the roads. We illustrate this above in the
case of monitoring to prevent a speciﬁc type of illegal cutting
(the cutting of trees that are too small or are a protected
species) but the argument can be extended to other problematic practices, such as the cutting outside of allotted
boundaries. In our analysis, the excessive cost associated
with cutting illegal timber (IT) forced the concessionaire to
build roads deeper into the allotted space to ﬁnd sufﬁcient
legal timber (LT), increasing forest fragmentation. The

restricted-area boundary problem – such as Arima et al. (2008)
have observed in the Amazon case – could be represented in
our model as a space occupied entirely by IT, forcing more
extensive road-building into surrounding regions to meet
capacity and causing similar increases in fragmentation. It is
certainly true that in any context, cutting IT will occur when
the net beneﬁts of doing so compare favorably with those of
moving to a new area to cut LT. However, these results
highlight that as the costs of cutting IT increase, the net
beneﬁts of moving to pristine areas become more favorable,
leading to higher fragmentation in the deﬁned time periods
upon which concession agreements are based. It is worth
noting that the fragmentation effect emerges from the need to
access more timber to meet capacity, rather than from any
speciﬁc aspect of the road-building algorithm. Thus, regardless of the approach to building roads to provide access
(whether a gridded ‘ﬁshbone’ or an optimized, distanceminimizing solution) we would expect some degree of the
same effect. As a ﬁnal note on the model results, the
concession holder in this model is already exhibiting a
constrained behavior by planning roads based only on
locations of LT. To the extent that concession holders, in
practice, build roads to access IT directly (and thus are less
constrained as a baseline than in this model), we would expect
the shift in road building under effective monitoring to be even
more signiﬁcant.
The effect of denser and more branched roads on the land
cover is greater forest fragmentation, which has been shown
to have substantial adverse ecological consequences as shifts
in light, moisture, and access allow some ﬂora and fauna
species to ﬂourish at the expense of others (Laurance and
Bierregaard, 1997; Perfecto et al., 2009; Tscharntke et al., 2007).
Edge habitats become dominant and pest invasions increase
with associated changes in community structure (Wilkie et al.,
2000). Perhaps more important are the indirect effects on the
forest brought by increased access via the roads – hunting and
poaching of large game are particularly salient examples in the
Congo Basin context. Wilkie et al. (1992) speculated that it was
the facilitation of hunting via roads rather than tree felling
that was the greater threat; Wilkie et al. (2000) found that
access to roads had cut the average hunting trip in the Congo
from 12 h to less than two. Roads also provide access for smallscale illegal logging ventures (Brown and Ekoko, 2001), whose
practices may be more destructive and less efﬁcient than
those of the concession holder. Finally, though deforestation
in the region is fairly low at present, demand for agricultural
land is expected to increase in future, and the access provided
by roads makes the resulting fragmentation a good predictor
of future deforestation (Zhang et al., 2006).
A second key result is the set of qualitative differences
demonstrated between the responses to spot and checkpoint
monitoring approaches. In the spot monitoring case, the
potential risk to the concessionaire of being caught for
harvesting IT is the same at all points in the grid, at all times
during the sanction period. In the checkpoint monitoring case,
the risk of being caught (and the potential loss to the
concessionaire) depends on what has already been cut in
that time period. In the spot monitoring case it is always or
never worthwhile for the concessionaire to cut IT, with a sharp
threshold marking the shift between the two regimes. In

contrast, in the checkpoint monitoring case it remains
worthwhile (at least sometimes) to cut IT under a range of
levels of monitoring effectiveness. The investment perspective for the two approaches may be then to invest in spot
monitoring if there are sufﬁcient resources to make it effective
and the beneﬁts justify the costs, and otherwise to invest in
checkpoint monitoring (where there will be some level of
response to even low levels of monitoring). Our analysis
examines the two approaches over a comparable range of
achieved forest outcomes, but does not examine the costs of
achieving them. The ability to compare the cost-effectiveness
of achieving particular forest outcomes through different
monitoring approaches has management as well as research
value, and should be a target for future research.
The insights discussed above are of particular relevance to
forest governance in a REDD+ (or REDD++) world. REDD+ is a
performance-based mechanism through which developedcountry donors can compensate developing countries for
forest emissions reductions, including through market mechanisms (Phelps et al., 2010). To ensure that REDD+ programs
and projects actually result in emissions reduction, an
improved and globally acceptable system of low-cost monitoring and enforcement is crucial. Popularly referred to as MRV
– monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation – the goal of improved
enforcement is to ensure that countries and agencies
participating in REDD+ projects monitor these projects (either
themselves or through reliable third parties), provide an
estimate of the amount of additional carbon sequestered
through their projects, and allow veriﬁcation of their estimates by credible third parties. In essence, the effectiveness of
REDD+ depends upon how much more effectively and
efﬁciently REDD+ projects are monitored compared to past
monitoring.
Our modeling analysis raises a set of questions that are
empirically testable through ﬁeld study and remote sensing
analysis, and the current interest surrounding REDD+ and
related experimentation into effective approaches at governance (e.g., Austin et al., 2010) may provide an ideal testing
ground for longitudinal studies of forest management. First
and most generally, are there detectable shifts in patterns of
road building in response to shifts in monitoring effectiveness? Second, are there also concomitant shifts in forest
ecology, and can they be attributed to observed shifts in road
building or other impacts of changes in monitoring effectiveness? Third, how do these impacts vary across different
approaches to monitoring? Finally, how do the costs of
achieving forest outcomes compare across these different
approaches? We present our analysis and the questions it
raises as a point of departure for empirical scholars of landuse change and concession forestry in the tropics, and invite
the coupling of existing and new data sets to models such as
ours in order to improve our understanding of the links among
forest ecology and forest management.
Although existing scholarship emphasizes the positive
impact of effective monitoring on resource outcomes (Chhatre
and Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005; Ostrom, 1990), our
research suggests that the spatial structure and speciﬁc
elements of monitoring practices can have a substantial
impact on how the co-beneﬁts of REDD+ projects will be
achieved. There is substantial variety in the types of

monitoring and enforcement approaches being proposed for
REDD+ – our analysis suggests that some monitoring strategies
may lead to greater forest fragmentation, even as they help
reduce emissions. Our results indicate the value of modeling
these system interactions and ﬁeld testing the effects of
different forest monitoring strategies to better understand
how monitoring will affect not only carbon emissions, but also
potential biodiversity and livelihoods outcomes generated by
forests.

Appendix. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.
11.005.
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